Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth by William Easterly et al.
 
Working Paper Number 94 
August 2006  
 
Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth 










We present evidence that measures of “social cohesion,” such as income inequality 
and ethnic fractionalization, endogenously determine institutional quality, which in 













The Center for Global Development is an independent think tank that works to reduce global poverty and inequality through 
rigorous research and active engagement with the policy community. This Working Paper was made possible in part by 
funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.  
 
Use and dissemination of this Working Paper is encouraged, however reproduced copies may not be used for commercial 
purposes. Further usage is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons License. The views expressed in this paper 















































 Views expressed here are those of the authors alone, and should not be attributed to the organizations with which they are 
affiliated. We thank participants from various conferences and seminars for valuable feedback, and Victoria Levin for 
excellent research assistance. Please address correspondence to Michael Woolcock, The World Bank, Mail Stop MC3-306, 
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Email: mwoolcock@worldbank.org 
2
 Department of Economics, New York University, and Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.  
3
 Office of the President, Maastricht University.  
4
 Development Research Group, The World Bank, and Kennedy School of Government, Harvard  
University. 
         
   1
1.  Introduction 
 
Policy and institutional quality are to a large extent endogenous. While the truth of this 
statement is familiar to most development scholars, the implications of it have drawn 
relatively little empirical attention. Understanding more about this relationship matters, 
because “poor institutional quality” and “failure to implement better policies” are so 
frequently identified as the causes of growth collapses, endemic poverty, and civil 
conflict. Such explanations are logically (and properly) followed by calls to improve 
institutions and policies, but an implicit assumption in such calls is that realizing them is 
simply a matter of choice, technocratic skill, and/or sheer political will. Seasoned 
politicians and policymakers of good will, however, characteristically encounter 
constraints that are at once more enduring and less tangible in nature. 
In this paper we endeavor to address systematically the constraints to policy 
reform in developing countries by examining the strength and direction of the 
relationship between social structures, political institutions, and economic policies. 
Specifically, we argue that one of the primary reasons why even good politicians in 
countries all over the world, but especially in low-income countries, often enact bad 
policies is that they experience significant social constraints on their efforts to bring 
about reform. These constraints are shaped by the degree of ‘social cohesion’ within their 
country. We show that social cohesion determines the quality of institutions, which in 
turn has important impacts on whether and how pro-growth policies are devised and 
implemented.  
A country’s social cohesion is essential for generating the confidence and 
patience needed to implement reforms: citizens have to trust the government that the   2
short-term losses inevitably arising from reform will be more than offset by long-term 
gains. The inclusiveness of a country’s communities and institutions (e.g., laws and 
norms against discrimination) can greatly help to build cohesion. On the other hand, 
countries strongly divided along class and ethnic lines will place severe constraints on the 
attempts of even the boldest, civic-minded, and well-informed politician (or interest 
group) seeking to bring about policy reform. We argue that the strength of institutions 
itself may be, in part, determined by social cohesion. If this is so, we propose that key 
development outcomes (the most widely available being “economic growth”) should be 
more likely to be associated with countries governed by effective public institutions, and 
that those institutions, in turn, should be more likely to be found in socially cohesive 
societies. We test this hypothesis for a sample of countries using (though well aware of 
the limitations of) cross-country regressions. 
In stressing the importance of social cohesion to understanding broad 
development outcomes, we caution against expecting that it might be the key, given that 
development is inherently complex. Moreover, our attempts to measure social cohesion 
in a formal sense should not blind us to social cohesion’s analytical power—i.e., its 
capacity to help us organize our thinking on the complex processes which lead to social 
or political choices—which may in turn serve to help us better identify the causal 
mechanisms linking social and political variables to short or long term development 
outcomes. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two we review the literature and 
summarize the data that is available to investigate the central hypotheses. This is 
followed in section three with our statistical analysis. While several earlier studies have   3
shown that differences in growth rates among low income countries are the result of lack 
of democracy, weak rule of law, and the like, we are more interested here in the social 
conditions that give rise to these institutional deficiencies. In section 3, we explore 
empirically whether there is a causal sequence that goes from social divisions to weak 
institutions to slow growth. The essence of our conclusion, supported by new 
econometric evidence presented here, is that pro-development policies are comparatively 
rare in the developing world less because of the moral fiber of politicians (though that 
surely matters) than because of insufficient social cohesion that impedes the construction 
of effective institutions (and thereby narrows a given policymaker’s room for maneuver). 
In section four we conclude by exploring some possible extensions and implications, in 
particular the need for more research on the determinants of social cohesion (focusing on 
historical accidents, initial conditions, natural resource endowments) and ways in which 
to foster it. 
 
2. Social Cohesion: Definitions, Evidence, and Data 
 
In seeking to unpack the notion of social cohesion, we concede from the outset that some 
infamous historical figures with a narrow—even sectarian—agenda have invoked social 
cohesion-type arguments as the basis for their actions. The desire to cultivate a sense of 
national unity and “purity” brought us the Holocaust and ethnic cleansing, so we are most 
surely not arguing that social cohesion equals cultural homogeneity or intolerance of 
diversity; quite the opposite. On the other hand, nor are we invoking some naïve 
suggestion that socially cohesive societies are always harmonious, devoid of political 
conflict or dissent. Rather, we use the concept of social cohesion to make the general   4
point that the extent to which people work together when crisis strikes or opportunity 
knocks is a key factor shaping economic performance. Graphic scenes on CNN during 
the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea neatly illustrates social cohesion in action: 
everyday citizens were shown tearfully selling their modest family treasures in the belief 
that their humble contribution was somehow making a difference to the financial health 
of their country. Where this sense of cohesion is lacking—as it was in, say, Indonesia—
the response to the crisis was far more sluggish and uneven, heightening a number of 
other latent and manifest political tensions. Managing these tensions during crises, and 
ensuring that they do not descend into outright or violent conflict, is a key political task 
(Bates, 2000). Failure to do so can be disastrous for rich and poor, powerful and 
powerless alike. As Rodrik (1997:1) correctly notes, “the deepening of social fissures can 
harm all.” 
Social cohesion has many formal definitions (for global overviews see Jensen 
1998, Canadian Government 1999, and Ritzen 2001). Judith Maxwell (1996: 13), for 
example, argues that social cohesion refers to the processes of 
building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in 
wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are 
engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are 
members of the same community.
5 
 
While generally sympathetic to this approach, we adopt a slightly more instrumental 
definition that more readily lends itself to measurement. Accordingly, for the purposes of 
this paper, we define social cohesion as the nature and extent of social and economic 
divisions within society. These divisions—whether by income, ethnicity, political party, 
caste, language, or other demographic variable—represent vectors around which 
                                                 
5 As cited by Jensen (1998).   5
politically salient societal cleavages can (though not inevitably or “naturally”) develop. 
As such, socially cohesive societies (as stressed above) are not necessarily 
demographically homogenous, but rather ones that have fewer potential and/or actual 
leverage points for individuals, groups, or events to expose and exacerbate social fault 
lines, and ones that find ways to harness the potential residing in their societal diversity 
(in terms of diversity of ideas, opinions, skills, etc). 
Presumably what others have defined as social capital—i.e., the resources 
inhering in relationships, networks, and other related forms of social connection 
(Woolcock 1998)—will be an important basis for this aptitude. Where social capital is 
increasingly being defined as a micro level variable (i.e., to study kinship systems, 
households, social networks, and community organizations
6), however, our central 
concern here is with features of society as a whole, for which the term social cohesion is 
more appropriate. Some of the same empirical indicators have indeed been used for both 
(see below), but we believe the concepts are most fruitfully applied at distinctive units of 
analysis, and do not wish to perpetuate further confusion.
7 
 
Direct Measures of Social Cohesion 
 
Various attempts have been made in the literature to measure social cohesion directly. 
The most common are: 
 
                                                 
6 On these debates see Foley and Edwards (1999), Putnam (2000), and Woolcock (2001), among others. 
7 The basic characteristics of “social cohesion” as defined here differ from those of social capital in other 
ways. For example, while there is a growing literature emphasizing that social capital can generate positive 
or negative outcomes for society (Portes and Landolt 1996; Woolcock 1998, Putnam 2000), we define 
social cohesion in such a way that more is generally better. In the end, however, the use of a particular term 
over another matters far less than that the terms be clarified for the purposes at hand, and that the issues 
they collectively encapsulate are brought to the table and seriously debated.   6
•  Memberships rates of organizations and civic participation 
Participation in social organizations have been measured in developing countries by 
Deepa Narayan and her collaborators (e.g., Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Krishna, 2002), 
but mostly on a micro (community) scale. At that level they are shown to be significant 
predictors of income and an aptitude for cooperation.  Robert Putnam’s (1993) important 
work uses membership of organizations as a measure of social cohesion (or what he calls 
social capital
8), and Helliwell and Putnam (1995) find that this is positively associated 
with regional economic performance in Italy (see also Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2000). Obtaining the same result from a larger sample of countries has proved 
problematic, however. Knack (2001), for example, shows that a ‘trust’ variable 
contributes to the explanation of economic growth, but that the ‘membership of 
organizations’ variable—which Knack (2003), following Olson (1983) and Putnam 
(1993), argues could be either bad or good for growth, respectively—shows only a 
modest positive effect. For these reasons and because of the relative small available 
sample, we will not use the membership variable. 
 
•  Measures of trust 
A typical measure on trust (from the World Value Survey) is the aggregate of the answers 
to the question “Do you think people can be trusted?” for a random sample of 
respondents. Work relating cross-country answers to this question to economic 
performance was pioneered by Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), and has since been taken 
up by several others (e.g., La Porta et al 1997; Knack 2001). The new surveys being 
conducted around the world, including OECD countries such as Australia and members   7
of the European Union, promise to yield significant new insights, and will allow us to 
address these issues with much greater confidence. Work in the transition economies is in 
its infancy, though some early promising work is starting to appear (e.g. Rose 1995). 
According to the World Values Survey data, “trust” is typically high in the richer 
countries (rates are around 50%) and low in developing countries. Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries generally have higher trust rates (between 15 and 35%) than 
Latin American (LA) countries (with rates as low as 5% in Peru). Turkey is remarkable in 
that it had a trust rate of only 10% in 1990 and 6.5% in 1995. African countries are in- 
between CEE and LA countries in trust levels, while Asian countries are in-between 
developed world and CEE countries.  
 
Indirect Measures of Social Cohesion 
 
Proxies for social cohesion have also been sought using structural factors such as class 
and ethnicity inequalities, which may undermine the capacity of different groups to work 
together. Measures of these variables include: 
 
•  Income distribution measures (Gini coefficients and share of income to middle 60%) 
The Gini coefficient has been used by Rodrik (1999) to address issues pertaining to 
economic divisions in society. Easterly (2001a) finds that what he calls the “middle class 
consensus” (i.e. a social inequality index that includes of the share of income going to the 
middle 60% of the population) is a better measure. It is suggestive—we do not establish 
causality here, but Easterly (2001a) addresses this issue—that countries with a middle 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Putnam’s (2000) most recent study explicitly adopts a narrower and more ‘micro’ approach than his 
earlier work.   8
class share above 50 percent are rich economies (see Figure 2). While it would be 
difficult to show that differences in middle class share are direct predictors of enormous 
differences in aptitudes for change, a plausible case can be made that socially cohesive 
countries will ensure that rich and poor alike share in both the costs and benefits of 
change, and thus enjoy greater prosperity than those more divided countries, where the 
benefits primarily go to the rich and the costs are borne by the poor. 
It is important to note that while the simple correlation between the Gini 
coefficient and the “middle class consensus” is high (0.88), there are nonetheless 
important exceptions. Some countries (e.g. U.S.) have a large middle class but (for rich 
countries) a high level of inequality; others have low inequality and a small middle class 
(e.g. Hungary), while still others have a large middle class and low inequality (also for 
rich countries) (e.g. the Netherlands). 
 
•  Ethnic heterogeneity (‘ethnolinguistic fractionalization’) measures 
The most widely used measure establishes the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.  India scores high on this 
measure (89), but so do, for example, Cote d’Ivoire (83) and Bolivia (63).  Examples of 
countries with low scores are Korea (0) and Japan or the Netherlands (1). 
Table 1a gives an overview of the indicators used for social cohesion.  For 57 
developing countries and 25 high-income countries we have data available on the middle 
class share and on ethnic fractionalization.  Data on trust is only available for 34 
countries (11 high income and 23 developing countries) for which also all the other data 
is available. Table 1b also includes our measures on institutions and their summary 
statistics.  Institutions have been assessed by experts from very different organizations.   9
 
[Tables 1a and 1b about here] 
 
The quality of political institutions clearly will be also an important factor for 
growth. Olson (2000) argues that governments with an “all-encompassing” interest in 
society’s prosperity and welfare will promote growth more than governments that have a 
more narrow interest. He argues that a stable autocrat will outperform an unstable 
autocrat, while a stable democratic government will outperform either form of autocracy. 
Best of all will be a democracy with checks and balances, enforcement of the rule of law, 
and with clear rules of the game that prevent the majority from excluding or 
expropriating a minority. Virtually all of the nations that are rich today fall into this latter 
category. It is not too much of a stretch to see that socially cohesive societies will be 
more likely to generate governments that have an “all-encompassing interest” in 
promoting growth. Indeed, a central hypothesis emerging from our framework is that 
high levels of social cohesion makes it easier to improve the quality of institutions. 
These arguments are also supported by the recent literature on corruption (e.g. 
Schleifer and Vishney 1993, Mauro 1995). Claims, for example, that corruption “greases 
the wheels” of growth simply do not stand up to empirical scrutiny (Tanzi and Davoodi 
1997, Kaufmann and Wei 1999).  
 
3.  New Evidence on Social Cohesion, Institutions and Economic Performance 
 
The central story of economic growth over the last 50 years has been the contrast 
between the years 1950-74 and 1975-2000. The former was a time of general prosperity,   10
in which all strategies yielded positive outcomes; rich and poor countries, open and 
closed economies, large and small nations, those in temperate and tropical climates—
everyone did well. The twenty-year period between 1974 and 1994, however, was 
disastrous for virtually everyone except the East Asian Tigers and India; the developing 
world suffered a twenty-year growth collapse, from which it has only recently emerged 
(Figure 1).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
While the causes of the global recession in the 1974-1994 are fairly well-known, 
it is instructive to examine some of the differences between those countries that 
weathered the storm, and those that did not. In his study of a large sample of developing 
countries, Rodrik (1999) finds compelling evidence that weak public institutions and 
(ethnically and economically) divided societies responded worse to the shock than did 
those with high quality institutions and united societies.  
We find something similar here. We define as most cohesive those societies in the 
lower half of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and in the upper half of share of the middle 
class, and as least cohesive the reverse.
9  We see that more cohesive societies have 
always grown faster than less cohesive societies, but the difference only became 
                                                 
9 So defined, the least cohesive countries are: Algeria, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Guatemala, Guyana, Kenya, Malaysia, , Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri  Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
The most cohesive are: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Egypt, Arab Rep., Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Sweden, United Kingdom.   11
pronounced with the recession in the latter in the 1980s, with a tepid recovery that failed 
to close the gap in the 1990s (see Figure 2). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
By what mechanisms does social cohesion affect growth? Consider first the role 
of institutions. Using a dataset compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) it is 
possible to assess whether high-quality institutions have been important for the LDCs.  
Figure 3 suggests they have been, i.e. that higher quality institutions (measured here by 
rule of law; we will try many different measures in the next section) are positively 
associated with higher average growth rates over the post-reform period.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Quality institutions themselves reflect the nature and extent of social divisions, as 
we will develop more formally in the next section. Figure 4 shows that, indeed, high 
quality institutions are associated with lower levels of inequality in developing countries. 
Here inequality as a proxy for social divisions is measured by the share of the middle 
class. If we had chosen instead of the middle class, the Gini coefficient, a similar result 
would have emerged. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
   12
Together, these suggestive empirical results show that building social cohesion—
through the construction and maintenance of high-quality institutions pursuing the 
common good, and through the lowering of economic (and other) divisions—has been, 
and remains, a vital task for countries wrestling with development. Ethnic divisions make 
it difficult—although not impossible, as we will see below—to develop the social 
cohesion necessary to build good institutions. Figure 5 confirms that more fractionalized 
societies have worse rule of law.
10 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
We are left then with two determinants of social cohesion and thus good 
institutions, namely initial inequality and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  We predict 
that societies with a lower initial inequality as proxied by a larger share for the middle 
class larger share for the middle class and more linguistic homogeneity have more social 
cohesion and thus better institutions, and that these better institutions lead in turn to 
higher growth.   
These predictions are confirmed in Table 2, where we use the different proxies for 
“good institutions” of Table 1b. For example, Table 2 shows four important measures of 
institutions that show a highly significant effect of social cohesion: on voice and 
accountability, civil liberties, government effectiveness and freedom from graft, with 
signs indicating more social cohesion leading to better institutions. The table shows the 
complete set of regressions using all the institutional measures. All of our measures of 
                                                 
10 Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) found that one measure of institutional ‘trust’ was negatively related to 
ethnic diversity.   13
institutional quality are positively associated with growth—as was shown by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) for their measures of institutions—and virtually all the 
institutional measures are related to both of our measures of cohesion.
11 Here, we have 
used three-stage least squares to take into account the possible endogeneity of 
institutions: our two indicators of social cohesion make natural instruments that allow us 
to identify a causal link from good institutions to growth. The instruments pass two over-
identification tests for whether they are excludable from the final regression. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Thus our findings support the two-stage hypothesis we outlined at the beginning: 
more social cohesion leads to better institutions, and that better institutions in turn lead to 
higher growth. This is true regardless of how we measure institutions. 
 
4.  Conclusions and Extensions 
 
If social cohesion is so important, how can it be nurtured?  While social cohesion is 
partly shaped by national leaders, social cohesion also depends on some exogenous 
historical accidents. A nation-state that has developed a common language among its 
citizens is more cohesive than one that is linguistically fragmented. This is not to say that 
linguistic homogeneity is bad or good; most nations started out as very diverse 
linguistically. Linguistic homogeneity may simply be an indicator of how much a group 
of nationals have developed a common identity over the decades or centuries that 
                                                 
11 “Trust” works less well in both equations, although the small sample is probably part of the problem.   14
national identity forms. Where such a common identity is lacking, opportunistic 
politicians can and do exploit ethnic differences to build up a power base. It only takes 
one such opportunistic politician to exacerbate division, because once one ethnic group is 
politically mobilized along ethnic lines, other groups will.
12 
This should not be interpreted in a pessimistic light – that nations where there are 
large cleavages of class and language are condemned to poor institutions and low growth. 
Of course, nations should not embark on forcible redistribution and mandatory linguistic 
assimilation. These results only say that on average lack of “exogenous” social cohesion 
has been exploited by politicians to undermine institutions, which in turn has resulted in 
low growth. But politicians can choose to build good institutions, unify fractionalized 
peoples, and defeat the average tendency to divide and rule. In fact where institutions are 
sufficiently well developed, there is no adverse effect of ethnolinguistic diversity on 
growth. The corollary is that good institutions are most necessary and beneficial where 
there are ethnolinguistic divisions. Formal institutions substitute for the “social glue” that 
is in shorter supply when there are ethnolinguistic divisions (Easterly 2001b).
13 
The other determinant of social cohesion is whether the historical legacy is one of 
relative equality or of a vast chasm between elites and masses. Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997; see also Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, Sokoloff and Zolt 2005) describe how 
inequality in Latin America arose out of factor endowments and historical accidents. The 
tropical land in Latin America was well-suited for large scale enterprises like silver mines 
and sugar plantations, worked by slaves or peons. The benefits of these operations largely 
                                                 
12 Varshney (2001) expands on this theme in India, showing that ethnic violence is primarily an urban 
phenomenon, and that it occurs overwhelmingly in cities where Hindus and Muslims rarely interact.   15
accrued to the small criollo class. The elite was kept small by restrictions on immigration 
from Iberia or elsewhere to the Iberian colonies. The labor force had to be forcibly 
recruited through the import of African-American slaves and the encomienda system that 
tied the indigenous people to the elite’s land. 
In Canada and in the North of the US, by contrast, the factor endowments were 
conducive to small-scale production of food grains. A middle class of family farmers 
developed. Practically unrestricted immigration and abundant available land (once the 
tragic process of despoiling the native inhabitants was completed) swelled the size of the 
middle class. Immigrants voluntarily assimilated into (and actively contributed to) the 
dominant middle class culture. The American South was a kind of intermediate case 
between North and South America, with a mixture of free family farmers, elite slave-
owners, and African-American slaves.
14 
One potentially important policy lever for enhancing social cohesion is education. 
Heyneman (2000) identifies three ways in which education contributes to social cohesion.   
First, it helps provide public knowledge about the very idea of social contracts among 
individuals and between individuals and the state. Second, schools help provide the 
context within which students learn the appropriate behavior for upholding social 
contracts, by providing students with a range of experiences in which they learn how to 
negotiate with people, problems, and opportunities they might not otherwise encounter. 
As Heyneman (2000: 177) puts it, “the principle rationale, and the reasons nations invest 
in public education, have traditionally been the social purpose of schooling... The 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 The notion of (ethno)linguistic fractionalization definitely begs operations on social cohesion within the 
European Union.  Extra institutional efforts are required to overcome this disadvantage of different 
languages.   16
principle task of public schooling, properly organized and delivered, has traditionally 
been to create harmony within a nation of divergent peoples.” Third, education helps 
provide an understanding of the expected consequences of breaking social contracts; 
indeed, it helps citizens understand and appreciate the very idea of a social contract. 
Given the vital role the state has in shaping the context and climate within which 
civil society is organized (Bunce 1999), it can, in some cases, also actively help to create 
social cohesion by ensuring that public services are provided fairly and efficiently (i.e. 
treating all citizens equally), and by actively redressing overt forms of discrimination and 
other social barriers. These happy outcomes are most likely to come about through the 
empowerment of domestic constituencies rather than via “conditionalities” imposed by 
external donors and development agencies (Collier and Dollar 2004). This is one of the 
conclusions of two recent World Development Reports (World Bank 2000b, 2001). 
We have pointed to the importance of a research agenda that looks into the 
cohesiveness of societies and the quality of public institutions, and their relationship to 
sustained growth. We need to know a lot more about how equitable and fairly to manage 
the costs and benefits associated with the transformation of society (Bates 2000), 
especially how to foster a greater sense of cooperation and inclusion in environments 
where there is (actual and potential) division, exclusion, and disaffection.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 For an application of this general argument to understanding growth collapses in LDCs, see Woolcock, 
Pritchett, and Isham (2001).   17
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics and Sources of Social Cohesion Variables 
 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Obs Min Max 
Ethnic Fractionalization  39.63  29.29  82  0  93 
Middle Class Share  45.95  6.85  82  30  56 
Gini 41.48  9.12  82  26  62 
Trust 32.07  16.28  34  5  64 
GDP per capita, PPP  6112.90  5556.69 82  476 20004




















GDP per capita, PPP 
 
GDP per capita growth 
 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (measures the 
probability that two randomly selected persons from a given 
country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group).  
Source: Mauro (1995), initially from the Atlas Narodov Mira 
(Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State 
Geological committee of the USSR, Moscow, 1964) and 
Taylor and Hudson (1972). 
 
Share of quintiles 2-4, average 1960-1996 
 
Average of the period 1900-1996 
 
Percentage of respondents in each nation replying “most 
people can be trusted”.  Source: World Values Survey 
 
World Bank (2000a) 
 
World Bank (2000a). 
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Table 1b: Summary Statistics and Sources of Institutional Variables 
 
 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Obs Min Max 
Voice and Accountability  0.352 0.92  82  -1.6 1.7
Quality of the Bureaucracy  3.678 1.46  72  1.4 6.0
Civil Liberties  3.397 1.62  81  1.0 6.1
Property Rights & Rule-Based Governance 3.232 0.82  56  1.0 5.0
Government Effectiveness  0.284 0.94  78  -1.7 2.1
Freedom from Graft  0.278 1.00  78  -1.6 2.1
Law and Order Tradition  3.743 1.40  72  1.4 6.0
Freedom from Political Instability and 
Violence  0.116 0.94 78  -2.4 1.7
Political Rights  3.305 1.83  81  1.0 6.4
Freedom from Regulatory Burden  0.386 0.60  82  -1.5 1.2




Voice and Accountability 
Quality of the Bureaucracy 
Civil Liberties 
Property Rights and Rule-Based        
Governance 
Government Effectiveness 
Freedom from Graft 
Law and Order Tradition 
Freedom from Political Instability 
and Violence  
Political Rights 
Freedom from Regulatory Burden 
Rule of Law 
 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), average 1984-98 
Freedom House, average 1972-98 
Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA), the 
World Bank 1998. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), average 1984-98 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) 
Freedom House, average 1972-1998. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) 
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Figure 1: Smoothed Median Growth, 1960-2002 
 

























Source: Calculated from World Bank (2003) 
 
 (Sample of 82 developing and developed countries) 
 
Figure 2: Index of per capita income in least cohesive
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Figure 3: Rule of law and per capita growth 1960-98
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 Figure 4: Share of the middle class and rule of law
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Figure 5:  Ethnolinguistic fractionalization and rule of law
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Ethnolinguistic fractionalizationTable 2: 3SLS Regressions for Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth, Using Different Measures of Institutions 
 
Equation 1: Institutions=C(1)+C(2)*Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization+C(3)*Middle Class Share 
 
Equation 2: GDPPCGR= C(4)+C(5)*Institutions 
 
 

























Voice and Accountability (KKZ)              
Coefficient -2.036  -0.01  0.061 1.727  0.974  1.50  1.54 82 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (3.44)*** (3.65)***  (5.07)***  (8.23)***  (3.11)*** 0.22  0.21  
Quality of the Bureaucracy (ICRG)              
Coefficient -1.431  -0.009  0.119 -0.131  0.613  3.06  3.04 72 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (1.47) (1.86)*  (6.11)***  -0.18  (3.13)***  0.08  0.08  
Civil Liberties (Freedom House), 1 most free, 7 most unfree           
Coefficient 7.425  0.019  -0.105 3.843  -0.534  0.57  0.66 81 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (7.32)*** (4.08)***  (5.12)***  (6.29)***  (3.10)*** 0.45  0.42  
Government Effectiveness (KKZ)              
Coefficient -2.602  -0.009  0.071 1.844 0.93  2.22  2.50 78 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (4.40)*** (3.29)***  (5.95)***  (9.56)***  (3.29)*** 0.14  0.11  
Freedom from Graft (KKZ)              
Coefficient -3.072  -0.009  0.081 1.876  0.829  2.58  2.84 78 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (5.06)*** (3.22)***  (6.64)***  (10.01)*** (3.28)*** 0.11  0.09  
Law and Order Tradition (ICRG)              
Coefficient -1.302  -0.009  0.118 -0.191  0.619  2.68  2.60 72 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (1.47) (2.26)**  (6.66)***  (0.26)  (3.24)***  0.10  0.11    11
Table 2, continued 


















































Freedom from Political Instability and 
Violence (KKZ) 
            
Coefficient -2.462  -0.009  0.064 1.991  1.001  1.90  1.93 78 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (4.05)*** (3.27)***  (5.24)***  (11.05)*** (3.31)*** 0.17  0.16  
Political Rights (Freedom House), 1 most free, 7 most unfree           
Coefficient 7.395  0.022  -0.109 3.67  -0.497  0.39  0.45 81 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (6.25)*** (4.01)***  (4.56)***  (6.76)***  (3.19)*** 0.53  0.50  
Freedom from Regulatory Burden (KKZ)              
Coefficient -0.278  -0.007  0.02 1.216  2.212  0.13  0.14 82 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (0.67) (3.32)***  (2.39)**  (3.89)***  (3.33)***  0.72  0.70  
Rule of Law (KKZ)              
Coefficient -2.989  -0.008  0.077 1.848  0.843  3.11  3.28 82 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (4.87)*** (2.67)***  (6.27)***  (10.95)*** (3.40)*** 0.08  0.07  
Trust              
Coefficient -54.111  -0.067 1.805  1.25  0.033 8.45  7.32 34 
t-statistic (p-value for Sargan/Hansen stat.)  (4.32)*** (1.17)  (7.36)***  (2.16)**  (2.00)**  0.00  0.01  
 
 